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Background: In Switzerland, age is the predominant driver of solidarity transfers in risk adjustment (RA). Concerns
have been voiced regarding growing imbalances in cost sharing between young and old insured due to
demographic changes (larger fraction of elderly >65 years and rise in average age). Particularly young adults aged
19–25 with limited incomes have to shoulder increasing solidarity burdens. Between 1996 and 2011, monthly
intergenerational solidarity payments for young adults have doubled from CHF 87 to CHF 182, which corresponds
to the highest absolute transfer increase of all age groups.
Results: By constructing models for age-specific RA growth and for calculating the lifetime sum of RA transfers we
investigated the causes and consequences of demographic changes on RA payments. The models suggest that the
main driver for RA increases in the past was below average health care expenditure (HCE) growth in young adults,
which was only half as high (average 2% per year) compared with older adults (average 4% per year). Shifts in age
group distributions were only accountable for 2% of the CHF 95 rise in RA payments.
Despite rising risk adjustment debts for young insured the balance of lifetime transfers remains positive as long as
HCE growth rates are greater than the discount rate used in this model (3%). Moreover, the life-cycle model predicts
that the lifetime rate of return on RA payments may even be further increased by demographic changes.
Nevertheless, continued growth of RA contributions may overwhelm vulnerable age groups such as young adults.
We therefore propose methods to limit the burden of social health insurance for specific age groups (e.g. young
adults in Switzerland) by capping solidarity payments.
Conclusions: Taken together, our mathematical modelling framework helps to gain a better understanding of how
demographic changes interact with risk adjustment and how redistribution of funds between age groups can be
controlled without inducing further selection incentives. Those methods can help to construct more equitable
systems of health financing in light of population aging.
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Societies in highly industrialized countries in Western
Europe, North America or Japan have undergone pro-
found demographic changes over the past decades. Life-
expectancy has increased substantially, owing to reductions
of mortality, better life-styles and greater medical possi-
bilities [1,2]. It is estimated that the average lifespan in
OECD countries rose by more than 6 years between 1970
and 2000 [3]. Although this growing life expectancy is* Correspondence: viktor.vonwyl@css-institut.ch
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reproduction in any medium, provided the origcommonly perceived as positive, it puts strains on the wel-
fare systems of industrialized societies. For example, the
ratio of retired individuals to active workers is increasingly
shifting towards the elderly, and fewer active workers have
to support more retired persons [4].
Apart from pension systems, health insurance systems
are also affected by those demographic trends. The im-
pact of aging societies – increasing average age and a ris-
ing share of elderly (>65 years) – on health care
expenditures (HCE) has long been recognized. For ex-
ample, recent projections of Swiss health care costs ad-
justed for expected demographic changes predict
substantial overall increases in HCE owing to a higher
proportion of elderly in the population and higher cost
growth for older insured [5]. As for the latter, the higheris is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
mmons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
inal work is properly cited.
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long-term observations. For example, Mendelson and
Schwarz analyzed Health Care Financing Administration
Data from 1977 through 1987 and noticed a dispropor-
tionally high cost growth among the elderly aged 65 and
more [6], later termed “steepening” by Buchner & Wasem
[7]. Such longitudinal analyses of age-stratified cost-
profiles were also performed for Switzerland and reached
similar results [8,9].
However, the reasons for the accelerated cost growth
among the elderly are still debated. In particular, the ef-
fects of age, medical progress, and interactions thereof
are not fully understood, and their disentanglement in
statistical models is very challenging. One prominent ex-
planation termed “red herring hypothesis” was put forth
by Zweifel et al. [10,11], which states that the cost in-
creases are not linked to age per se but rather to proximity
of death (which is more likely at older age), although op-
posing studies found significant age effects on HCE in-
creases [12-14]. Despite this unresolved debate, there is
unanimous agreement that health care expenditures will
rise further in the future, which in turn will have implica-
tions for health insurance and premium financing.
In settings with competing health insurers and com-
munity-rated premiums (e.g. Belgium, The Netherlands,
and Switzerland), many of the effects of population aging
on health financing are mediated through risk adjust-
ment (RA). Risk adjustment (or risk equalization) is a
necessary means to prevent risk selection because indi-
vidual health care expenditures can vary greatly and in
part even predictably, whereas health insurance pre-
miums do not [15]. Therefore, premiums systematically
do not match costs for certain age groups (e.g. elderly),
which leads to incentives for “cream skimming” and dis-
crimination of insured. Risk selection is also harmful
from a societal perspective, because it can create losses
in welfare and efficiency [15].
Risk adjustment reduces incentives for risk selection.
It operates by estimating the difference between group-
specific average health care expenditures and the overall
average. The difference between these two amounts is
then taxed from groups with below average costs and
passed on as a subsidy to groups with greater than aver-
age costs. Thus, risk adjustment should equal out risk
differences in portfolios of insurers to eliminate “cream
skimming”.
In general, risk adjustment leads to re-distribution of
money from younger, healthier individuals to older,
sicker insured, thereby establishing an intergenerational
solidarity because age is one of the main drivers of risk
adjustment transfers (especially in the context of the
Swiss risk adjustment formula). Hence, if the share of
elderly in a population grows over time (and thus aver-
age health care expenditures increase), this means thatyounger, healthier individuals have to contribute more to
risk adjustment in order to achieve risk equalization.
Solidarity across age groups is also established by other
transfer schemes in mandatory health insurance. In
particular, young adults also benefit from tax-financed
premium subsidies. But quantitatively risk adjustment
is by far the largest solidarity component in manda-
tory health insurance: In 2012 young adults contrib-
uted CHF 1.37 billion to risk adjustment, but received
only CHF 0.52 billion in premium subsidies [16]. As
a consequence risk adjustment should play a key role
in any attempt to re-distribute the burden of rising
HCE in aging societies.
Nevertheless, the knowledge on interactions between
population aging and risk adjustment is still partial.
What is more, frameworks for the implementation of
fair (as defined normatively by society) and stable inter-
generational solidarity transfers within risk adjustment
are, to our knowledge, still lacking. In this paper, we aim
to address two questions. First, we aim to investigate
how the Swiss risk adjustment scheme (or any scheme)
responds to population aging. We will analyze possible
effects both from a cross-sectional (i.e. different age
groups at single time-points) and from a lifetime per-
spective (i.e. following an age-cohort of insured over
time). Second, we aim to seek ways how solidarity en-
forced by risk adjustment can be maintained in long
term without financially overwhelming especially vulne-
rable age groups.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.
First follows a brief explanation of the Swiss health care
setting. Second, to gain a better understanding of the pro-
cesses leading to an increasing premium burden for young
insured we develop a simple model of risk adjustment
payments over time from the perspective of young adults,
in which we include variables for health care growth and
demographic changes. Although the model is generic and
can accommodate any age splits we will center these cal-
culations around young adults aged 19 to 25 years for rea-
sons that will be explained in the methods section. The
third section outlines the construction of a mathematical
model to assess the balance of risk adjustment over a life-
cycle. By use of those models from the second and the
third section we assess the importance of demographic
change for the increase of solidarity transfers from young
to old using data from the Swiss risk adjustment statistics.
Moreover, we will sketch out ideas on how to reduce and
stabilize the levels of risk adjustment payments for specific
age groups, again using the young adults as an example.
The results section describes applications of the mathem-
atical models within stochastic simulations and tests
different reform suggestions for how they reduce the pre-
mium burden for 19 to 25 year old insured. The paper
concludes with a discussion of the findings.
von Wyl and Beck Health Economics Review 2014, 4:7 Page 3 of 14
http://www.healtheconomicsreview.com/content/4/1/7Methods
Setting
The Swiss system of social health insurance is influenced
by Enthoven’s concept of managed competition [17]. A
large number of health insurers (124 in 1996; 62 in
2011) compete for customers and are obliged to accept
any person willing to enroll, independent of age or
health status. Mandatory health insurance is organized
on a pay-as-you-go basis. Benefit packages are strictly
defined and comprehensive. Insurance is not linked to
employment, and each insured has to pay the premiums
directly to the insurer, although state-funded premium
subsidies are granted to individuals in need on the basis
of taxable income. Currently 30% of all insured receive
such financial assistance [16].
Premiums for mandatory insurance are charged as
age-independent community rates with two exceptions.
Children between 0 to 18 years of age are granted risk-
rated premiums with regard to age on a mandatory
basis. Moreover, the health insurance law states that in-
surance companies can grant premium reductions to
young adults aged between 19 to 25 years. An internal
risk adjustment scheme (i.e. without supplemental funds
from the government), defined by retrospective redistri-
bution of premiums across sex and 15 age groups, was
introduced in 1993 and left unchanged until 2011 [18].
Starting in 2012, the Swiss risk adjustment was reformed
to be based on prospective payments and to additionally
include prior hospitalization as a crude morbidity indica-
tor [19]. Further reform steps are currently discussed in
the Swiss parliament and will likely include the introduc-
tion of pharmaceutical cost groups.
Variable notations for modeling analyses
In the following, we will develop a simple model with
only two groups of insured, which we term young adults
and adults. We are using the following notation:
C = Average health care expenditures
x = Number of individuals
p = Proportion in the general population of insured
older than 18 years
a = Risk adjustment payment
Y = Indicator for young adults (e.g. 19–25 year olds)
A = Indicator for adults (e.g. >25 year olds)
i = Indicator variable for the 30 risk groups (ordered by
age) that were included in the Swiss risk adjustment
scheme until 2011 (15 age groups, male/female). The
indicator i = 1,..,k corresponds to risk groups for
young adults with the cut-off denoted by k, and the
remaining k + 1 to 30 risk groups represent adults.
Definition of risk adjustment equations
We define average health care expenditures for young
adults Y, adults A and overall asCY ¼
Xk
i¼1CixiXk
i¼1xi
CA ¼
X30
i¼kþ1CixiX30
i¼kþ1xi
and C ¼
X30
i¼1CixiX30
i¼1xi
ð1Þ
The proportion of young adults and of adults is defined,
respectively, by pY ¼
Xk
i¼1xi=
X30
i¼1xi , and p
A = 1 − pY.
Thus, we can also define average health care expenditures
C as
C ¼ pY CY þ 1−pY CA ð2Þ
Risk adjustment transfers for young adults and adults
can then be written as
aH ¼ CH− C ð3Þ
for H = Y or H = A. We will use equation (3) as start-
ing point for the development of a model of changes
in the amount of risk adjustment transfers for young
adults.
Cross-sectional analysis of impact of demographic
changes on risk adjustment transfers
For this analysis, we consider the intergenerational part
of risk adjustment transfers defined in equation (3). Given
equation (2), we can write the intergenerational transfer
per person for young adults at time point t = 0 as
aY0 ¼ CY− C ¼ CY− pY CY− 1−pY
 
CA ð4Þ
Note that because C
− Y < C
−
risk adjustment transfers
for young adults are also negative (aY0 < 0), meaning that
they have to make payments into the fund.
For time points t > 0 the intergenerational part of risk
adjustment transfers becomes
aYt ¼ CY 1þ ΔYð Þt− pY 1þ dYð Þt CY 1þ ΔYð Þt
− 1 − pY 1þ dYð Þt
 
CA 1þ ΔAð Þt ;
ð5Þ
whereby (1 +ΔY)
t and (1 +ΔA)
t stand for average health
care expenditure (HCE) growth for young adults and
adults with average growth rates of ΔY and ΔA, respec-
tively. The expression (1 + dY)
t denotes average changes in
the fraction of young adults in the population of all in-
sured older than 18 years (decrease if dY <0). C
Y , CAand
pY denote starting point values at time 0 (time index is left
away for the sake of simplicity).
We now combine equations (4) and (5) into a diffe-
rence equation. In addition, we separate the terms into
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dY (first row) and those that are dependent on dY
(second row).
aYt − a
Y
0 ¼
h
CY 1þ ΔYð Þt − CA 1þ ΔAð Þt
 i
− 1− pYð Þ CY− CA
 h i
þ pY 1þ dYð Þt CA 1þ ΔAð Þt − CY 1þ ΔYð Þt
 h i
ð6Þ
If t = 1, then equation (6) simplifies to
aY1 − a
Y
0 ¼ 1− pY
 
CYΔY − C
A
ΔA
 
þ dYpY CA 1þ ΔAð Þ − CY 1þ ΔYð Þ
 
ð7Þ
This equation (7) can be transformed into a change
rate ΔaY through division by aY0 .
ΔaY ¼ aY1 − aY0
 
=aY0 ð8Þ
which is important in the context of lifetime redistribu-
tion described in the next section. Equation (7) allows
for comparative static analyses of the impact of different
growth parameter combinations on changes of risk ad-
justment transfers over time. For example, if there was
only a change in the composition of the population (i.e.
dY ≠ 0 and ΔY, ΔA = 0), then expression (7) simplifies to
dYpYð Þ CA−CY
 
. The sign of this simplified expression
depends on dY only (change in proportion of insured
aged 19 to 25 years), which for Switzerland turns out
to be negative (<0, c.f. Results). For young adults with
negative transfers (aY < 0) this means that the amount
to be paid increases, because equation (7) becomes
even more negative. Alternatively, if the only change
present was high cost growth among adults (i.e. ΔA >
0 and ΔY, dY = 0), then expression (7) becomes pY−1ð Þ
CAΔA
 
, which is negative because (pY − 1) < 0. Finally,
high cost growth for adults and an increase in their share
of the population (i.e. dY <0, ΔA > 0 and ΔY = 0) leads to el-
evated risk adjustment contributions for young adults by
the amount of dYpY þ pY−1ð Þ CAΔA
 
þ dYpYð Þ
CA−CY
 
, because this expression is negative. A more
formal analysis of partial derivatives of equation (7) with
respect to different growth parameters is given in Appen-
dix A.1.
To summarize, from our two generation model we can
derive the following conclusions with respect to popula-
tion aging. All other things equal, the risk adjustment
debt for young adults increases
 if HCE growth rates are higher for adults than for
young adults
 and/or if the proportion of young adults in the
population is shrinking.Basic model for lifetime transfers in risk adjustment
(cohort analysis)
Given that risk adjustment contributions made by spe-
cific age groups can change (as demonstrated in the pre-
vious section), what are possible implications for the
lifetime balance of risk adjustment transfers? In particu-
lar, will the current young generations pay more into risk
adjustment than they will ever receive back when they
grow old?
In the following we will address those questions by
developing a discrete-time overlapping generations mo-
del, similar in spirit to those developed for the ana-
lysis of pension systems (e.g. [20]). Several features of
the Swiss risk adjustment make such an analogy quite
fitting. First, Swiss social health insurance, of which
risk adjustment is an integral part, is a pay-as-you-go
system. Because Switzerland only has an internal risk
adjustment system (without any tax-financed contri-
butions as for example in Germany) this means that
in any given year the contributions made into the fund
must equal the benefits paid (henceforth: “symmetry
property”). In addition, risk adjustment transfers fol-
low an age-gradient similar to pension schemes, with
younger age groups contributing and older genera-
tions profiting from risk adjustment (although the
addition of further morbidity-criteria may weaken the
age dependency).
The overall idea for the model is as follows. The curve
of risk adjustment transfers ordered by amount and
weighted by group size roughly resembles two triangles:
One below the zero line (net payers aged 19 to 60 years)
and one above (net beneficiaries, aged 61 years and
older, Figure 1a). As mentioned above, we will make use
of the fact that for internal risk adjustment schemes
the two areas defined by the zero-line and the risk-
adjustment curve are of equal size (symmetry property).
Initially, we assume that the shape of those triangles in a
given year resembles the pattern of risk adjustment
transfers for a single person over a lifetime. In other
words, the x-axis interpretation in Figure 1a changes
from “age” to “time”. In the simplest model we further
assume that a person only lives for two generations: one
in which contributions are made and the second in
which payments are received. Subsequently we will ex-
pand the model to more generations and by modeling
growth of risk adjustment payments (Figure 1a and b).
The model notation is the same as for the previous
section.
Two overlapping generations, no population change,
undiscounted payments
As a convention the superscripts N and P denote ne-
gative transfers (contributions into fund) and positive
transfers (payments from the fund), respectively.
Figure 1 Schematic drawing outlining the concept for modelling lifetime risk adjustment transfers. a shows monthly risk adjustment
payments in 2011, ordered by amount of payment (which corresponds to increasing age). Because the volume of payments into and out of the
fund are symmetric in Switzerland, the area under the curves below and above the zero-line are identical. For the model of lifetime payments the
volume of transfers into the fund (and hence out of the fund because of the symmetry) are approximated by a triangle confined by the most
negative transfer to the point where the curve of transfers crosses the zero-line on the x-axis. b generalizes the model of lifetime payments for 3
time periods (two as a net-payer into and one as a beneficiary of risk adjustment).
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Figure 1a (AN0 at baseline 0) can be approximated by the
area of a triangle 0; pN0 ; a
Y
0

) in Figure 1b.
AN0 ¼ aY0 pN0 =2 ¼ AP0 ð9Þ
The notation is similar as in the previous cross-
sectional model, with aY0 denoting the risk adjustment of
the youngest age group (young adults) and pN0 represent-
ing the proportion of net-payers (aged 19 to 60 years) at
baseline (time 0). Because of the symmetry property
AN0 ¼ AP0 must hold.
We now turn to the case of two time periods with a
cost increase of (1 + ΔaY) between the two periods. The
variable ΔaY stands for the increase of risk adjustment
contributions to be made by young adults in the second
time period (cf. Equation 8). Again, there is one time
period with payments made into and one with payments
received out of the fund. Turning to Figure 1b the young
age period with negative transfers is defined by the
triangle 0; pN0 ; a
Y
0
 
and the old age period by triangle
pN0 ; 1; a
max
3
 
. Because of the symmetry property of in-
ternal risk adjustment we can define both triangles in
terms of AN0 .
AN1 ¼ AP1 ¼ aY0 1þ ΔaYð ÞpN0 =2 ¼ 1þ ΔaYð ÞAN0 ð10Þ
If ΔaY ≥ 0 then it is straightforward to show that the
inequality AN0 ≤A
N
1 holds. This means that the payments
made into the fund at time 0 are surpassed by the pay-
ments received out of the fund at time point 1.More than two net-payer generations, no population
change, present-value perspective
In order to enhance realism of the model we split the life
phase of payments to the fund into several separate time
periods and allow cost growth between periods. This is
shown in Figure 1b for three phases. As a person ages
she transits two periods with decreasing contributions
into the fund, i.e. the blue area including the points
0; pN0 =2; a
Y
0 =2; a
Y
0
 
and the red triangle pN0 =2; p
N
0 ; a
Y
1 =2
 
,
as well as a third life phase with payments out of the
fund as shown by the green triangle pN0 ; 1; a
max
3
 
.
The term aY0 =2 follows from the second intercept the-
orem: If we divide the line (0,pN0 ) of triangle (0; p
N
0 ;
aY0 ) into halves, then the length of the vertical down-
ward line 0; aY0
 
also reduces to 0; aY0 =2
 
at point
pN0 =2. This implies that the area of triangle (0; p
N
0 =2;
aY0 =2) is one fourth of the larger triangle (0; p
N
0 ; a
Y
0 ), a
property used in expression (11).
The steepening dotted black lines symbolize cost growth
between different time periods (also note that the area of
the red triangle is larger than what the corresponding blue
segment for the same period would be). Moreover, we
now discount all payments at a rate of r.
Let’s first focus on the blue area 0; pN0 =2; a
Y
0 =2; a
Y
0
 
and the red area pN0 =2; p
N
0 ; a
Y
1 =2
 
in Figure 1b. We de-
note the sum of those negative transfers over n (here
two) time periods by TNn .
TNn ¼ AN0
Xn−1
i¼0
1þ ΔaYð Þi 1
1þ rð Þi
n−i
n
 2
−
n− iþ 1ð Þ
n
 2" #
ð11Þ
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strate for the case of two periods (n = 2) with net contri-
butions into and a third period (n + 1) with payments
out of the fund. When i = 0 then the first term in the square
bracket defines the full triangle at time 0 0; pN0 ; a
Y
0
 
. In
order to obtain the blue segment 0; pN0 =2; a
Y
0 =2; a
Y
0
 
we
have to subtract the smaller triangle pN0 =2; p
N
0 ; a
Y
0 =2
 
. The
area of the triangle in the second period pN0 =2; p
N
0 ;

aY0
1þ ΔaYð Þ=2Þ takes cost growth into account. Because of
the symmetry property for internal risk adjustment, the
area of the green triangle pN0 ; 1; a
max
3
 
representing
insured with positive payments out of the fund at
time point 3 (n + 1) can be defined according to the
following equation.
TPnþ1 ¼ APnþ1 ¼ AN0 1þ ΔaYð Þn
1
1þ rð Þn ð12Þ
In order to show that over a lifetime the present value
of transfers received from risk adjustment are equal or
greater than the amounts paid in we have to verify the
following inequality.
Xn−1
i¼0
1þ ΔaYð Þi 1
1þ rð Þi
n−i
n
 2
−
n− iþ 1ð Þ
n
 2" #
≤ 1þ ΔaYð Þn 11þ rð Þn
ð13Þ
It is commonplace in the literature to discount pay-
ments at rates between 2% and 3%. In contrast, we esti-
mated the increase of ΔaY at 4.5% p.a. between 1996 and
2011 using Swiss risk adjustment statistics ([21], not
shown). Under those circumstances the expression
1þΔaY
1þr
 i
as a function of i is monotonically increasing,
which is an important result on the way to proof in-
equality (13).
In order to demonstrate that expression (13) is true
we consider a triangle 0; pN0 ; a
Y
0 1þ ΔaYð Þ
 
. It is obvious
from Figure 1b that the area of this triangle is an over-
estimate of the actual area of all colored segments, but
the mathematical formulation is more tractable. If this
triangle is still smaller in size than the one determined
by the right hand side of the inequality (green triangle in
Figure 1b), then inequality (13) must hold.
The triangle 0; pN0 ; a
Y
0 1þ ΔaYð Þ
 
corresponds to a
situation where the index i in (1 + ΔaY)
i and 1
1þrð Þi of the
left hand side of equation (13) is held fixed at i = n − 1.
This leads to (1 +ΔaY)
n − 1 and 1
1þrð Þn−1 , which are the lar-
gest possible values in the iterations (provided that ΔaY.
and r are both positive and the function is monotoni-
cally increasing). Equation (13) can then be rewritten
as follows.1þ ΔaYð Þn−1 1
1þ rð Þn−1
Xn−1
i¼0
n−i
n
 2
−
n− iþ 1ð Þ
n
 2" #
≤ 1þ ΔaYð Þn 11þ rð Þn
ð14Þ
It is easy to show that the sum of the square brackets
is just 1 (an expansion of the sum cancels out all terms
except for the first and the last, which are 1 and 0, re-
spectively), leading after some re-arrangements to the
following equation.
1≤
1þ ΔaYð Þ
1þ rð Þ ð15Þ
Given the observed value for ΔaY and an assumed dis-
count rate of 3% inequality (15) holds true. Further note
that the right hand side of this inequality can be inter-
preted as a return rate for the payments made into the
fund. Moreover, inequality equation (15) fully integrates
with equations (7) and (8) defining ΔaY, and the dis-
cussion of effects of different change parameters on risk
adjustment payments for young adults applies. In par-
ticular, the expected greater increase in costs for adults
(compared with young adults) and the decreasing frac-
tion of young adults in the population (as a result of
demographic changes) both increase ΔaY and therefore
will enhance the return rate.
More than two net-payer generations, population change,
present-value perspective
It is straightforward to show that the above reasoning
can be generalized for any n generations of net payers
(the return rate will actually remain the same). But what
happens if, in addition, the population as a whole gets
older in average age? We model this change by intro-
ducing an additional growth rate dN, which stands for
changes in the proportion of net contributors (aged 19
to 60 years) into risk adjustment.
Turning again to the scenario with multiple time steps
on the left hand side and with one time step on the right
hand side, we obtain the following inequality.
Xn−1
i¼0
1þ ΔaYð Þi 1þ dNð Þi 1
1þ rð Þi
n−i
n
 2
−
n− iþ 1ð Þ
n
 2" #
ð16Þ
≤ 1þ ΔaYð Þn 1þ dNð Þn 11þ rð Þn
Again, studying the combination of growth rates
1þ ΔaYð Þi 1þ dNð Þi 11þrð Þi is a key step in the analysis of
inequality (16). Because dN was positive in the past (the
fraction of net payers - corresponding to all age groups
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though not continuously [21]) it is reasonable to assume
that all growth rates of net payer fractions combined as
a function of i are also monotonically increasing. Pro-
ceeding like above we fix all growth rates on the left
hand side at i = n − 1 and at i = n for the right hand side
term of equation (16). After rearrangements and simpli-
fications we obtain inequality (17).
1≤
1þ ΔaYð Þ 1þ dNð Þ
1þ rð Þ ð17Þ
This inequality (17) holds true if ΔaY, dN, r ≥ 0 and
ΔaY ≥ r or dN ≥ r. Because demographic changes are
likely to increase ΔaY, the return rate on the right-hand
side of the equal sign is also expected to become larger,
all other things equal.
In summary, the models developed in this section sug-
gest that, all other things equal,
 insured will on average receive more (discounted)
payments out of the risk adjustment fund than they
will have contributed over a lifetime,
 and that the expected demographic changes are
likely to have an increasing effect on the return rate.
How can the solidarity burden be redistributed?
The calculations from the basic models suggest that, if
unchecked, the solidarity burden for young adults will
continue to grow at high rate, which is mainly due to
health care expenditure growth among older genera-
tions. While those younger generations may still be net
beneficiaries of risk adjustment payments over lifetime,
their owed risk adjustment debt may nonetheless over-
whelm their financial means (cf. [22]). In Switzerland,
one such vulnerable group are the young adults aged
19–25 years, which are entitled to premium reductions
by law. This relaxation from the community-rate prin-
ciple was introduced to provide relief for young adults
who have limited disposable income. However, by 2011
those rebates have all but disappeared [22]. As already
observed by Beck in 2004 [23], the reason for those
diminishing rebates is that the Swiss risk adjustment
scheme ignores the possibility for premium reductions
to young adults and overcharges this age group. This
problem has been recognized by federal authorities (e.g.
[24]), but no convincing solutions have been presented
so far. In particular, many proposed solutions neglect
that any reduction of solidarity transfers (be it as a pre-
mium reduction or a reduction of risk adjustment con-
tributions) must be compatible with risk adjustment
so as not to induce selection incentives for insurers.
McGuire et al. [25] and Beck et al. (Beck K, Buchner F,
van Kleef R, von Wyl V: Theory of risk equalization: Arewe on the wrong track? submitted) have provided meth-
odologies for how to limit solidarity transfers within risk
adjustment systems. In line with their suggestions we de-
velop a method that can correct for the expected shifts
in demography and keep solidarity contributions for spe-
cific age groups stable over time. To this end, we intro-
duce two additional parameters in the model described
by equation (7).
γ = Growth factor determining an upper limit of risk
adjustment payment growth. For example, this param-
eter can be used to decouple risk adjustment contribu-
tion growth for young adults from the growth rate of the
remaining adults, which is the main driver for the ob-
served increases in younger age groups (c.f. Results).
ρ = Factor for reduction of risk adjustment payments
(e.g. a premium rebate for young adults). In addition to
the stabilization by γ a further reduction of nominal pay-
ments can be granted. For example, in Switzerland it is
currently discussed to charge only 50% of the nominal
risk adjustment contributions from 19 to 25 year old in-
dividuals (i.e. ρ = 0.5) [22].
Solution for two risk adjustment groups
In general, the reductions are implemented by subtracting
an amount ut from the nominal RA-payment aYt (defined
in Equation 7) so that current RA-payments (at time t) for
young adults after correction are equivalent to a baseline
payment times a pre-specified growth rate γ.
aY0 1þ γð Þt ¼ aYt −ut ð18Þ
Solving for ut yields equation (19).
ut ¼ aYt −aY0 1þ γð Þt ð19Þ
Corrected payments as defined by (18) can be modi-
fied further by a second parameter ρ that defines the
rebate (<1) on nominal RA payments for specific groups
(e.g. 50% to 19 to 25 year olds). This reduction is applied
to the stabilized risk adjustment contribution aY0 1þ γð Þt
for young adults defined in (18), and then equation (19)
becomes
ut ¼ aYt −ρaY0 1þ γð Þt: ð20Þ
Thus, the degree of fairness is determined by the pa-
rameters γ and ρ. The full equation for reduced inter-
generational risk adjustment transfers in young adults
reads as
a˜t
Y ¼ aYt − ut ¼ ρaY0 1þ γð Þt ð21Þ
For the transfers to sum to zero the payments benefit-
ting older generations must also be shortened by a cer-
tain amount. We denote this deduction by vt.
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A ¼ aAt − vt ð22Þ
Moreover, we set the restriction that the sum of inter-
generational transfers between young adults and adults
must equal to zero according to equation (23)
1− pYt
 
aAt − vt
 þ pYt aYt − ut  ¼ 0 ð23Þ
Solving for aAt −vt
 
and plugging into (22) yields ex-
pression (24)
a˜t
A ¼ − p
Y
t
1− pYt
ρaY0 1þ γð Þt ; ð24Þ
which corresponds to the new intergenerational risk ad-
justment payment of young adults to adults.
An extension of the reasoning in this section to several
age groups is given in Appendix A.2. Additionally, in
Section A.3 of the appendix we show that the lifetime
balance of payments stays positive even after reductions
of risk adjustment for specific young age groups.
Results
Retrospective analysis of intergenerational solidarity
transfers in Switzerland
Next, we illustrate the mathematical models defined by
equations (7) and (16) from the methods sections by re-
trospectively analyzing solidarity transfers between ge-
nerations over the period of 1996 to 2011 within Swiss
risk adjustment. As an example, we center this and theTable 1 Evolution of risk adjustment transfers between 1996
Health care expenditures
(CHF per month)
Year Proportion of young adults Young adults Adults
1996 11.1% 61 159
1997 10.8% 61 166
1998 10.6% 61 175
1999 10.6% 62 181
2000 10.5% 65 192
2001 10.4% 68 203
2002 10.5% 69 210
2003 10.5% 71 220
2004 10.5% 73 234
2005 10.5% 75 246
2006 10.4% 72 247
2007 10.3% 73 257
2008 10.3% 76 267
2009 10.3% 79 275
2010 10.3% 80 280
2011 10.3% 80 283following analysis on the group of young adults aged
19–25 years, and the rationale for that decision is de-
tailed in the methods section and in a companion paper
(von Wyl V, Beck K: Distribution of premium burden for
mandatory health insurance in Switzerland, submitted).
To inform the models we used data from the official
Swiss risk adjustment statistics 1996 through 2011 [21],
which are displayed in Table 1. The second column
shows the proportion of young adults in the Swiss popu-
lation of individuals older than 18 years. Over the 15 year
observation period this proportion has decreased by
0.8% points, thus the share of young adults has shrunken
slightly. Columns 3 and 4 show average costs for the
two age groups, whereas columns 5 and 6 represent rela-
tive changes using 1996 as the base year (100%). Overall,
health care expenditures for young adults have increased
by 32% at an average growth rate of 1.88% and even by
78% for adults older than 25 years (average growth rate
3.94%).
Over time, intergenerational risk adjustment payments
for young adults have risen from CHF 87 per month in
1996 to CHF 182 in the year 2011 (Table 1, column 7).
Yet the effect of those solidarity transfers on the adults’
side remained rather small. In 1996 each adult received
CHF 11 per month in solidarity transfers from 19 to
25 year olds. Fifteen years later those payments have
only risen by CHF 10 to a total of CHF 21 per month
(Table 1, column 8). Overall the solidarity burden for
young adults has experienced the highest absoluteand 2011
Cost increase Monthly risk adjustment
payment into (<0) or
from (>0) the fund
(base year 1996)
Young adults Adults Young adults Adults
100% 100% −87 11
101% 105% −94 11
101% 110% −101 12
101% 114% −107 13
106% 121% −114 13
111% 128% −121 14
113% 133% −127 15
117% 139% −133 16
121% 147% −143 17
123% 155% −153 18
118% 156% −157 18
120% 162% −165 19
125% 169% −172 20
129% 173% −176 20
131% 177% −180 21
132% 178% −182 21
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with little effect for adults due to the demographic con-
stellation (i.e. much more adults than young adults).
Next, we investigated the importance of the three
model parameters (ΔY,ΔA, dY) for the increase of solidar-
ity payments by young adults. Following the discussion
of partial derivatives in Appendix A.1 (equations (A.1.1)-
(A.1.3)) we quantified the magnitude of change of RA
payments for a one unit parameter increase. To this end
we used health care expenditures in 2011 and averages
of cost growth and demographic change rates over the
15 year observation period for calculations (Table 1),
which yielded values of CHF 21.75, CHF −254.0 and
CHF 72.20 for dy, ΔA and ΔY, respectively. In other
words, solidarity payments owed by young adults are
most sensitive to health care expenditure growth among
adults, whereas shifts in population composition (i.e.
fewer young adults) seem to play a less important role.
This finding was confirmed when we performed cor-
relation analyses of observed annual changes in dy, ΔA
and ΔY with observed increases in RA contributions of
young adults ΔaY. While spearman correlations of ΔaY
with dy (rho = −0.45) and ΔY (rho = 0.11) did not reach
statistical significance, the HCE growth rate of adults ΔA
showed a strong, statistically significant correlation with
ΔaY (rho = 0.81, p-value < 0.001).
Along those lines we decomposed the impact of de-
mography on the cumulative observed increase of risk
adjustment payments between 1996 and 2011 using
equation (7). Over this time period the monthly risk ad-
justment contribution rose by CHF 95 for young adults
(Table 1, column 7). The demography-dependent term
of equation (7) sums to CHF 2, whereas the independent
terms amount to CHF 93. Thus, 98% of the increase was
driven by health care expenditure growth and only 2%
were attributable to demographic changes, meaning the
decreasing proportion of young adults in the population.
How will solidarity transfers develop in the future?
Based on the algorithms for RA modifications developed
in the methods section and on data presented in Table 1
we performed projections of solidarity transfers between
young adults and adults 15 years into the future, starting
in 2011 and ending in 2026. Moreover, we tested the im-
pact of two different reform suggestions to relief the pre-
mium burden for younger generations. This was done by
repeated stochastic simulations based on equation (7). In
particular, we used the cost and demography informa-
tion for the year 2011 from Table 1 as baseline and pro-
gressed stepwise in 1 year intervals into the future by
randomly selecting, for each analysis year, HCE growth
parameters for young adults and adults from the distri-
bution of growth rates observed between 1996 and 2011
(assuming that they came from a Gaussian distribution).The parameter values for the demographic change dy
stemmed from predictions of demographic changes in
Switzerland [26] (conservative scenario) and was held
fixed at dy = −0.01234 per year. Subsequently, HCE and
risk adjustment contributions were calculated. Each si-
mulation run, consisting of the full 15 year observation
period, was repeated 10′000 times.
We explored three scenarios. The first scenario repre-
sents the status quo (before the 2012 risk adjustment re-
form) without any post-hoc modifications of nominal risk
adjustment transfers. For the second scenario risk adjust-
ment contributions by young adults were stabilized to in-
crease only with their own HCE growth rate (1 +ΔY)
t (note
that alternate choices could consider income growth).
Thus restriction (18) becomes aY0 1þ ΔYð Þt ¼ aYt −ut .
In the third scenario the risk adjustment payments
were further reduced by 50% after capping growth (i.e.,
γ = ΔY and ρ = 0.5), which yields the condition 0:5aY0
1þ ΔYð Þt ¼ 0:5 aYt −ut
 
.
The results of those simulations are displayed in
Figure 2. The solid lines represent the status quo scenario
and suggest that solidarity contributions by young adults
(blue line) will grow steadily at a greater-than-linear rate
from CHF −182 in 2011 to CHF −378 [95% simulation
interval −322; −439] in 2026. In contrast, per-capita con-
tributions received by older generations will increase only
moderately from CHF 21 in 2011 to CHF 35 [30; 41] in
2026. The second scenario, which includes a stabilization
of RA growth for young adults (dotted line) leads to risk
adjustment payments of −244 [−205; −287] by young
adults in 2026, whereas adults would receive CHF 25 [21;
30]. If additional reductions on risk adjustment (here:
50%) were granted to young adults this would lead to a
solidarity burden of −122 [−103; −143] (starting from
CHF −91 in 2011), and adults would receive monthly con-
tributions of CHF 13 [11; 15] (up from CHF 10 in 2011).
Along the same lines we modeled lifetime redistribu-
tion through risk adjustment. In particular, we simulated
the life cycle of a 19 year old insured starting in 2011
and progressed in one year steps towards the age of 82
(average life expectancy in Switzerland for the year 2011
[27]). Using risk adjustment contributions of the year
2011 as a basis we modeled yearly cost increases for all
15 age groups (by drawing random yearly growth rates
from a multivariate normal distribution that was informed
with observed cost increases for each age group [21]). All
age-specific risk adjustment transfers were summed up
and discounted at 3%. In total, 10′000 such life cycles
were simulated and repeated for the two different reform
suggestions.
Overall, those simulations suggest that for the baseline
scenario discounted payments of CHF 83′164 are made
into the fund and CHF 114′707 are received out of the
Figure 2 Projections of risk adjustment transfers from young adults to adults. Monthly intergenerational risk adjustment transfers of young
adults (blue lines) and adults older than 25 years (red lines). The solid lines project transfers without any modifications, and the dashed lines show
hypothetical transfers after capping transfer growth for young adults by their health care expenditure growth rate.
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capping risk adjustment payment growth at 2% for
young adults the net surplus dropped to CHF 17′069 [2′
336, 36′833]. If an additional rebate of 50% on stabilized
risk adjustment payments is granted to young adults,
then the lifetime balance of discounted payment in-
creased to CHF 19′030 [4′297, 38′795] compared with
the scenario without rebate in addition to stabilization.
Discussion
The view that Western societies will have to face rising
healthcare expenditures because of population aging is
largely uncontested. Increasing health costs are also ob-
served in Switzerland, which has led to shifts in soli-
darity transfers over the past years as witnessed by the
doubling of risk adjustment payments made by young
adults since 1996. In this paper we have analyzed those
intergenerational solidarity transfers between young and
old via a mathematical model and estimated the lifetime
balance of discounted risk adjustment transfers.
We observed that population aging continuously tends
to increase risk adjustment contributions from younger
generations. In a model analysis informed by data from
Swiss risk adjustment and focusing on young insured
aged 19–25 years we found that disparate health care
utilization patterns between young and old insured were
at the base of the problem of rising solidarity transfers
from young adults to older generations. While health
care expenditures for young adults grew only moder-
ately, cost growth was almost twice as high among all
adults aged 26 years and more. This development has
widened the gap of health care expenditure levels be-
tween the two age groups. Since risk adjustment oper-
ates at closing the gap in order to prevent risk selection,this mechanism has led to increasing intergenerational
solidarity payments owed by young adults.
But how problematic is the rising solidarity burden for
younger insured? As for Switzerland, we believe that
there is ample societal justification for lowering the bur-
den of risk adjustment payments for young adults aged
19 to 25 years. First and foremost, the current legislation
is inconsistent with regards to solidarity contributions by
young adults. While the law explicitly allows premium re-
ductions for 19 to 25 year olds, risk adjustment legislation
demands that all insured aged 19 and more are treated
equal, thus leaving no room for premium rebates.
Second, as outlined in detail in [22], there is mounting
evidence that young adults may not be able to carry
their solidarity burden, which leads to inefficiencies and
inequalities in health financing. Data presented in the
companion paper suggest that young adults have to rely
heavily on their parents for health insurance premium fi-
nancing. Along the same lines, the proportion of young
adults who are eligible for premium subsidies has risen
(although not steadily) from 41% in 2000 (the first year
with detailed statistics available) to 44% in 2011 [16].
Third, voting data also presented in the companion paper
suggest that the current system with strictly community-
rated premiums reflects preferences of net contributors,
and young adults in particular, less well than those of
older generations who benefit from intergenerational so-
lidarity in the status quo situation (von Wyl V, Beck K:
Distribution of premium burden for mandatory health in-
surance in Switzerland, submitted). It is furthermore re-
markable that older generations of today contributed less
to solidarity at younger age because of partially age-rated
premiums and the possibility for opting-out prior to the
reform in 1996.
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and the observed steepening of cost growth across age
gradients represent new developments that were not
part of voters’ expectations at the time of the referen-
dum for the new health insurance act implemented in
1996, which introduced community rating and a health
insurance mandate.
Taken together, those trends have the potential to en-
danger the generational contract, because they can lead
to overwhelming solidarity transfers from young to old
(as shown by our model) and thus deteriorate the ac-
ceptance of the community-rating principle among the
young. Such tendencies are already observed in surveys
on the Swiss pension system, which is also under pres-
sure as a result of the demographic change [28].
Consequently, the subject of lowering the growing
financial burden of social health insurance for young
insured has gained political momentum and has even
found its way on the regulator’s agenda. Several reform
suggestions have been discussed in the news media, ran-
ging from excluding young adults from risk adjustment,
abolishment of premiums for children to relieve young
families, or the introduction of new premium age groups
for individuals above 50 years to levy more health insur-
ance costs on older generations. What is rarely consid-
ered in those suggestions, however, is that in settings
with internal risk adjustment (as in Switzerland) such re-
bates must either be implemented through risk adjust-
ment itself or must at least be reflected, otherwise new
selection incentives are created. The premium rebates
for young adults are an example of an inconsistent regu-
lation that collided with risk adjustment and led to un-
wanted results [22].
Within this study we have developed a framework for
how such reforms of health premium financing could be
implemented in a consistent manner, and we have in-
vestigated possible effects on the balance of lifetime risk
adjustment payments. We argue that any premium re-
ductions must be implemented directly at the level of
risk adjustment payments, thereby giving insurers the
possibility to pass on those risk adjustment reductions
as premium rebates to young adults. In that regard our
method resembles the work of McGuire et al. [25]. Our
approach extends theirs by further introducing the con-
cept of stabilization of payments at predefined levels
over time. For example, as our analysis has shown risk
adjustment payments by young adults increase at a rate
that is approximately proportional to health care expen-
diture growth in older age groups. Without stabiliza-
tion intergenerational risk adjustment contributions may
otherwise soon again rise to levels that exceed disposable
means of young adults.
Despite an ever growing solidarity burden, over life-
time the younger generations of today can still expect anet gain from risk adjustment, all other things equal and
given that the current level of health care can still be fi-
nanced in the future. Interestingly, the models suggest
that the expected demographic changes may even in-
crease their lifetime rate of return on risk adjustment
contributions. As the share of older insured increases
over time, former net-recipients of funds from risk ad-
justment may turn into net-contributors, and therefore
the number of net-payers into the fund increases. For
example, the group of 51 to 55 year old women still re-
ceived a small payment from the fund in 1996, whereas
15 years later the same age group has become a net-payer.
In addition, the observed greater average HCE growth
for older age groups compared with young adults further
increases the return rate of risk adjustment. Similar results
are known from modelling studies of pay-as-you-go social
security systems [20,29] or health insurance [30], which
found the rate of return also to be dependent on cost
growth among older generations (i.e. recipients of pay-
ments) and/or increases in the proportion of net payers.
Interestingly, an application of generational accounting for
health financing to Switzerland corroborates our observa-
tion that currently young generations will receive more
payments from social health insurance than they will have
to contribute over a lifetime [31]. But when these authors
performed a more comprehensive analysis including all
money streams for health financing the lifetime balance of
payments turned negative for several younger age groups.
Although developed for the Swiss setting, our models
of demographic effects on risk adjustment and on the
life-time balance of transfers also apply to other coun-
tries with risk adjustment, such as the Netherlands or
Germany. But since both countries raise premiums for
mandatory insurance in an income-dependent manner,
the direct effects of demographic changes on risk ad-
justment will be less felt than in Switzerland (whereas
health financing of those countries will be more affected
by the expected decrease of the ratio of active to retired
workers).
Similar to our framework for controlling age-dependent
solidarity transfers, the U.S. has implemented a rule that
age-based premiums are only allowed to vary within a ra-
tio of 3 (oldest age group) to 1 (youngest) [25]. In contrast,
solidarity restrictions between age groups as a means to
improve equity are usually not needed in settings with
income-dependent premiums.
However, our modelling findings hinge on assump-
tions regarding rates of risk adjustment growth, the pro-
portion of net payers, and discount rates. Also, further
modifications to risk adjustment such as the planned
introduction of pharmaceutical cost groups in Switzerland
will have a yet unclear impact on the balance. For exam-
ple, the proportion of net payers pN may suddenly change
if additional morbidity criteria are introduced into the risk
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aging on the parameters ΔaY and p
N is not continuous and
difficult to predict in the long run. An aging population
drives up the population average of HCE from which risk
adjustment contributions are measured, and age groups
which have formerly received payments from risk adjust-
ment may become net-contributors in subsequent years.
Finally, our model focused only on risk adjustment pay-
ments and ignored any other components of health finan-
cing such as direct and indirect taxes, private insurance,
and premium subsidies. Furthermore, it should be noted
that our model does not address issues of sustainability
and affordability of health finance. Generational account-
ing may offer suitable tools for such more comprehensive
analyses [32].
Conclusions
In summary, the framework developed in this paper may
help to construct a more equitable system of health fi-
nancing in light of population aging and to strengthen
the acceptance of the intergenerational contract in social
health insurance systems with community-rating.
Appendix
A.1 Analysis of change rates
We now analyze equation (7) by calculating the partial
derivatives of aY1 −a
Y
0
 
with respect to the variables
dY, ΔY, ΔA.
∂ aY1 −a
Y
0
 
=∂dY ¼ pY CA 1þ ΔAð Þ−CY 1þ ΔYð Þ
 
ðA:1:1Þ
This partial derivative (A.1.1) indicates that changes in
risk adjustment contributions resulting from demo-
graphic trends are also dependent on the absolute differ-
ence of cost levels between young adults and adults at
time t=1. Because HCE and growth rates of adults are
larger than those of young adults, i.e. CA 1þ ΔAð Þ > CY
1þ ΔYð Þ expression (A.1.1) is positive. Going back to
equation (7) describing the change in risk adjustment
payments for young adults it becomes apparent that an
increase in the proportion of young adults by dY reduces
their risk adjustment debt, because this will make ex-
pression (7) less negative.
The partial derivative with respect to HCE growth for
adults is as follows.
∂ aY1 −a
Y
0
 
=∂ΔA ¼ dYpY þ pY−1
 
CA ðA:1:2Þ
As long as pY represents a minority this expression is
negative since (dYp
Y + pY − 1) < (2pY − 1) < 0, which means
that all other things equal a one unit increase in HCE
growth for adults leads to an increase of the risk adjust-
ment debt for young adults.Equation (A.1.3) shows the partial derivative with re-
spect to HCE growth in young adults.
∂ aY1 −a
Y
0
 
=∂ΔY ¼ − dYpY þ pY−1
 
CY ðA:1:3Þ
Expression (A.1.3) has the inverse sign of (A.1.2).
Thus, all other things equal, a one unit increase in HCE
growth for young adults decreases their risk adjustment
debt.
A.2 Solidarity reductions for several risk adjustment
groups
The algorithm described in equations (18)-(24) can also
accommodate reductions for several age groups i = 1,..,m.
For the simple case where modifications of RA transfers
only apply to net contributors to risk adjustment this can
be written as
a˜i;t ¼ ai;t − ui;t ðA:2:1Þ
for age groups i = 1,..,m.
The solidarity cap is implemented according to equation
(21), whereby ρi is set to 1 if no post-hoc modifications
to risk adjustment payments are applied. Likewise, if
no modifications to γi apply then it can simply be set
to 0.
ui;t ¼ ai;t − ρiai;0 1þ γ i
 t ðA:2:2Þ
Next, we derive the solidarity transfers for older age
groups m+1 to 30. We denote those groups of beneficiar-
ies from intergenerational solidarity transfers by subscript
r and treat them as one group (for sake of simplicity). As
in the simple case with only two age groups discussed
above the sum of intergenerational solidarity transfers
must equal to 0 in internal risk adjustment systems, and
therefore the new transfers from young insured to the
(old) reference group can be written as
a˜r;t ¼ −
Xm
i¼1
xi;t
xr;t
ρiai;0 1þ γ i
 t
; ðA:2:3Þ
with r symbolizing the reference population consisting
of all m+1,…,30 remaining groups and the variables xi,t
and xr,t being the number of individuals in group i and
the reference group r, respectively.
Modifications of transfers within recipients of RA pay-
ments (e.g. higher payments for specific age groups) are
also possible, but they require an additional calculation
step, in which the total volume of intergenerational RA-
payments from younger age groups are redistributed
within older generations. This can be achieved, for each
age group j = m+1 to 30, by defining weights wj,t accor-
ding to equation
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πjX30
j¼mþ1πj
; ðA:2:4Þ
whereby πj denotes the group specific factor (analogous
to ρi).
A.3. Implication of restricted solidarity for lifetime
redistribution
How is the lifetime balance of payments into and from
the risk adjustment fund affected by the modifications
proposed in equations (18) to (24)? As defined by equation
(18) rebates are defined as a reduction of nominal pay-
ments. By use of inequality equation (16) the lifetime bal-
ance in settings with premium reductions for specific age
groups g (which also correspond to specific time periods
as an individual transits through all age groups over life-
time) can therefore be defined by
TNn − a
Y
0
X
i∈g
1þ ΔaYð Þi 1þ dNð Þi 1
1þ rð Þi
n−i
n
 2
−
n− iþ 1ð Þ
n
 2" #
ρi
ðA:3:1Þ
≤TPnþ1− a
Y
0 1þ ΔaYð Þnþ1 1þ dYð Þnþ1
1
1þ rð Þnþ 1X
j∈g
n− j
n
 2
−
n− jþ 1ð Þ
n
 2" #
ρj
Note that the indices i and j have somewhat different
interpretations. The left-hand side of equation (A.3.1)
sums up all payments made over n time periods, and
hence i refers to time. The right hand side of equation
(A.3.1) represents, according to our convention, the vol-
ume of all contributions made by net payers at time
n+1. Hence the parameter j has the interpretation of
age groups. This distinction does not alter the con-
clusions, however.
We have already demonstrated that the inequality
TNn ≤T
P
nþ1 holds if the combination of growth rates yields
a monotonically increasing function. Therefore we only
have to proof that the reductions up to period n are
smaller than the sum of all reductions at time point
n+1. We will first demonstrate this for constant, time-
independent reductions ρ. Since all factors before the sum
sign combined are monotonically increasing we can fix i
at n for all growth rates on the left-hand side of equation
(A.3.2), which makes them constant.
aY0 1þ ΔaYð Þn 1þ dNð Þn
1
1þ rð Þn
X
i∈g
n− i
n
 2
−
n− iþ 1ð Þ
n
 2" #
ρi
ðA:3:2Þ≤ aY0 1þ ΔaYð Þnþ1 1þ dYð Þnþ1
1
1þ rð Þnþ1
X
j∈g
n− j
n
 2
−
n− jþ 1ð Þ
n
 2" #
ρj
Because all elements of the sums over i and j are time-
independent and the same on both sides of the equation
they can be dropped. Thus, the remaining inequality
must hold true given our assumption of monotonically
increasing growth terms in combination.
Using the same approach, it is simple to demonstrate
that the inequality also holds when growth of aY0 is
capped by a pre-defined, positive growth rate γi (by re-
placing the parameter ΔaY in equation (A.3.2), proof not
shown).
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